


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WESTERN EUROPE — CANADA — INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis Unpopular
with Junior Officers

A substantial number of junior officers in the Greek military reportedly disapprove of Prime Minister Karamanlis and his policies, according to reports in recent weeks [REDACTED]. The disapproving officers lack organization, however, and do not appear to be engaged in active coup plotting at this time.

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Tension in Athens' relations with Ankara inhibits the appeal of military conspiracies, as have a series of recent transfers, promotions and retirements in the army leadership by which the government has replaced supporters of the former junta with individuals loyal to the present government.

Junior officers, most of whom owe their careers to the former junta, fault Karamanlis primarily for what they view as an "opening to the left" exemplified by the legalization of the two small communist parties and the return to respectability of a handful of communists who now have seats in parliament. They fear that officers who were retired by the former junta and are now being reinstated may be either leftists or not sufficiently committed to the anti-communist cause. We have no evidence that any more than an insignificant number of leftists are being returned to the army.

The dissident officers reportedly realize that as time goes by and further transfers take place the possibility of a conspiratorial group emerging in key army positions diminishes.

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Nonetheless, [REDACTED] believes that a coup could be mounted anytime within the next three years. After that period, however, the cumulative effect of transfers, retirements, and new appointees might rule out such an action. He said that no such action would be taken while there was the possibility of war with Turkey and that no one leader for such an action exists at present. He also noted that a small handful of unidentified junior officers had obviously become informants for the government, thus making other junior officers wary.

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The dissidents reportedly feel that no Greek politician can be trusted. A minority, however, still believe that Minister of Defense Averoff represents the only acceptable replacement for Karamanlis. Averoff has kept on good terms with a number of officers who apparently have been led to believe that he would be more favorably disposed toward the army than Karamanlis. (Secret No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem)

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Swedish Prime Minister Threatens Elections

In an interview this week, Swedish Prime Minister Palme threatened early elections if the government and the non-socialist opposition are unable to agree on certain pending economic legislation.

Palme's threat was probably only a ploy to get the opposition Liberal and Center parties to support the government's economic policy. Public support for the Liberals is at an all time low and they may give in to the pressure rather than face early elections. In addition, support for Palme's Social Democrats is growing, and the opposition parties have to consider the possibility that Palme may follow through on his threat.

The Social Democrats have had to depend on the tacit support of the opposition parties because of the even split in parliament between the socialist and the non-socialist parties. The Liberals have voted with the government since May of last year when Palme persuaded them to break with the opposition bloc. The Center Party has been supporting the government since March. Until the Liberals came to the Social Democrats' rescue, Palme had to depend on the Communists to stay in power. (Confidential)

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Italian Extreme Leftists Plan Violence During
President Ford's Visit Next Week

Italian extreme leftist extraparlimentary groups plan demonstrations in major Italian cities immediately before and during President Ford's visit to Rome on June 3, [REDACTED]

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The leftists want to exploit the extra publicity drawn by such activity at that time to show a worldwide audience their ability to mobilize against the conservative themes the ruling Christian Democrats are using for the regional elections in mid-June. The Christian Democrats are emphasizing the need for stronger law-and-order measures to control the increasing violence by both extreme left and right groups.

After demonstrations on June 2 in such cities as Milan, Turin, Florence and Naples, activists are to converge on Rome for action the next day. The leftist leaders, who have deliberately not orchestrated their plans, expect to improvise as the situation develops. [REDACTED] however, anticipates

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--demonstrations near the US embassy and in most other parts of the city to give the impression that all Rome is in an uproar;

--violent outbursts in Rome's major streets and squares where the effect on domestic and especially on foreign public opinion would be maximized;

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
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--brief street blockages and sit-ins
to create traffic jams that will
hamper police action; and

--vandalism of US firms, US tourists,
and businesses associated with the
US. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)

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Finnish Government To Continue for Time Being

The Finnish government, which was to have resigned on May 29, will reportedly continue in office for the time being to complete pending legislation. The current lineup of unfinished work will require parliament to sit at least until June 10.

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President Kekkonen reportedly has decided to deal with the current government crisis in two stages. He will first announce elections and then dissolve parliament at an appropriate time. According to Finnish radio, Kekkonen has said that the timing of the European Security Conference summit will affect the choice of the election date. In any case, if Kekkonen dissolves parliament in June, elections would not be held before September. (Confidential)

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French Nuclear Power Policy Debate Ends

The French government seems close to winning its gamble that consultation with the people will lead to support for its nuclear power program. Even though the administration's public campaign to defend the program ended quietly with insipid parliamentary discussions this week, the whole process will probably be touted as an example of Giscard's efforts to open up the policy making process.

Last October, the government initiated a strongly backed program to achieve consensus on the ambitious nuclear power program. It included a vast public information campaign, consultations on site selection with local representatives, and parliamentary deliberations. The lively national debate which ensued was expected to reach a high point when the parliament took up the subject in mid-May. The stage was set early in the month by several protest demonstrations, a hunger strike, and bombings at one nuclear construction site. Public interest was not reflected in the parliament, however; the Industry Minister's speech was heard by only about 60 of the 490 deputies and he was questioned with a notable lack of intensity. Senate consideration was similarly uninspired.

The Minister defended the government's program on the grounds that energy growth is necessary for economic growth which, in turn, is needed for social reform. Furthermore, he noted that nuclear energy is the only area in which France can expand its consumption without endangering its independence.

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2 | Plans to expand nuclear energy yields were confirmed by President Pompidou just before his death last April. At that time the existing nuclear capacity was about eight percent of French electrical power production. Paris has said it hopes that by 1985 nuclear power will provide 70 percent of electrical power. This would equal one quarter of the nation's total energy production.

| One clear conclusion emerging from the parliamentary consideration was that no political party opposed nuclear power per se. The left opposition has instead focused its complaints on use of US technology, insufficient public information, and lack of consultations.

| The Interior Minister has said that the government already has agreements from local authorities for more than the nine sites required to keep the program on schedule. Some local opposition persists, however, and because it has no recourse to established political parties, it may well be expressed in demonstrations or even additional violence.

| The government is not likely to change its plans because of this opposition, but could do so if its program for the next three years proves to be too ambitious. Problems in developing industrial capacity, training skilled personnel, and raising capital are already appearing that could delay the construction of the 24 power plants now on the schedule. (Confidential)



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